Aerial Warfare Fallacy: Rethinking US Military Strategies
Examining the history of air superiority promises and their failures, this article challenges the delusion of quick victories from the air that may have influenced the US approach to the Iran conflict.
The promise of air superiority delivering a swift triumph has often proven to be illusory, as history has repeatedly shown. To understand the roots of Donald Trump's Iran military strategy and the combative rhetoric of his defense secretary, Pete Hegseth, one must look back over a century.
In 1921, a year before Benito Mussolini and his blackshirts marched on Rome to launch the Fascist era, an Italian general named Giulio Douhet published "The Command of the Air", proposing a revolutionary shift in warfare.
Douhet argued that victory in the future would no longer come from the grueling trench combat of the Great War. Instead, he envisioned large-scale aerial bombardments, targeting not just combatants but civilians, civilian infrastructure, and logistics.
This doctrine of air superiority has influenced military planning and strategy for decades, with the promise of quick, decisive victories from the sky. However, the reality has often been quite different, as several historical examples illustrate.
The bombing campaigns of World War II, the Vietnam War, and more recent conflicts in the Middle East have all shown that air power alone is not a panacea for military success. Civilian casualties, logistical challenges, and the resilience of ground-based forces have repeatedly undermined the promise of air supremacy.
Yet, the allure of air superiority persists, and it may have played a role in shaping the US approach to the Iran conflict. The delusion of easy victory from the air may have seduced the US into another war, one that could prove as intractable and costly as past conflicts where air power failed to deliver the promised results.
As the world watches the unfolding events in the Middle East, it is crucial to learn from history and avoid the trap of believing that air superiority alone can secure a swift and decisive outcome. The lessons of the past suggest that a more nuanced, comprehensive strategy is needed to achieve lasting peace and stability, one that recognizes the limitations of air power and the resilience of determined ground forces.
Fonte: The Guardian
